Resourced Authority A Mechanism-Design Model for Participatory Governance of Deployed AI Agents
By Praphul Chandra, Sujit Gujar, Ganesh Ghalme
"Proposes a mechanism design for participatory AI governance: stakeholders fund/reject compute budgets, aggregated via hysteresis gate, released as signed compute licenses to make authorization self-enforcing."
Abstract
We give a formal mechanism design model for the continuous participatory governance of a deployed AI agent. The mechanism is built on the principle that governance should control an AI agent through resource allocation so as to make authorization self enforcing via compute budgets. The mechanism seeks to establish the Safe AI paradigm that compute is an effective governance lever. We situate our work as a compliance or commons overlay on a deployer. One governance period is an extensive form game in which verified human stakeholders arrive sequentially and contribute, on a provision or a rejection market, in a governance currency that is deliberately distinct from the agents compute. A funding aggregator turns raw contributions into breadth weighted effective supports - a two threshold gate with hysteresis converts net support into a binary authorization that, through a coupling map bounded by an exogenously certified safety ceiling, releases a metered compute budget - realized in hardware as a signed compute license so that the decision is self-enforcing. We characterize the class of agents the mechanism can govern and isolate manipulation of the governing electorate by the governed agent as the central open problem. We also introduce several challenges addressing manipulation of governing electorate by the governed agents.
Technical Analysis & Implementation
Overview§
This paper presents a formal mechanism design framework for continuous participatory governance of deployed AI agents. The core innovation is to treat compute as the governance lever: stakeholder contributions are aggregated into a binary authorization that releases a metered compute budget, enforced in hardware via signed licenses.
Formal Model§
Stakeholders arrive sequentially and contribute $c_i \in \mathbb{R}$ in a governance currency (positive for provision, negative for rejection). Contributions are breadth-weighted and summed into net support:
$$ S_t = \sum_{i \le t} w_i c_i $$
where $w_i$ reflect the verifier's stake or breadth. A two-threshold gate with hysteresis converts $S_t$ into a binary authorization state $H_t \in \{0,1\}$:
$$ H_t = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } H_{t-1}=0 \text{ and } S_t \ge \tau_{\rm on} \\ 0 & \text{if } H_{t-1}=1 \text{ and } S_t \le \tau_{\rm off} \\ H_{t-1} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} $$
The authorization state maps to a compute budget via a coupling function $B_t = g(H_t)$, bounded by an exogenously certified safety ceiling $B_{\max}$: $0 \le g(0) \le g(1) \le B_{\max}$.
Implementation Sketch§
The mechanism is realized by running the agent in trusted hardware that enforces signed compute licenses. When $H_t$ transitions to 1, the hardware mints a license for $B_t$ compute units; when $H_t$ transitions to 0, the license is revoked. This makes the decision self-enforcing: the agent physically cannot exceed its authorized compute, so it has no incentive to disobey.
The following Python snippet simulates the hysteresis gate:
class HysteresisGate:
def __init__(self, tau_on, tau_off, B_on, B_off):
self.tau_on = tau_on
self.tau_off = tau_off
self.B_on = B_on
self.B_off = B_off
self.H = 0
self.S = 0
def contribute(self, w, c):
self.S += w * c
if self.H == 0 and self.S >= self.tau_on:
self.H = 1
elif self.H == 1 and self.S <= self.tau_off:
self.H = 0
return self.compute_budget()
def compute_budget(self):
return self.B_on if self.H else self.B_offKey Insights§
Hysteresis prevents authorization oscillation and gives stakeholders a persistence period. Separating governance currency from compute ensures decisions reflect social preference rather than resource arbitrage. The paper characterizes the class of agents governable under this mechanism and identifies manipulation of the governing electorate by the governed agent as the central open problem, introducing several specific challenge directions for future work.
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